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Liquidity Traps and the  
Price (In)Determinacy of Monetary Rules 
 
A predominate view in monetary economics today is that a central bank should be 
transparent concerning its goals and objectives rather than following a cloudy discretionary 
policy.  That transparency can be reflected in an explicit monetary target.  Prior to the 2008 
Financial Crisis, the fad monetary target in central banking was inflation.  Recently, economists 
and central banks have been considering alternative monetary targets such as the price level and 
nominal GDP (NGDP). 
 A very important issue facing the choice of monetary target is whether the price level of 
an economy can be determined by a central bank pegging the interest rate according to a 
monetary rule that pursues that monetary target.  This issue is very relevant since most central 
banks set a short-term interest rate rather than a monetary aggregate.  If the central bank cannot 
determine the price level, then the price level will be free to take multiple or infinite time paths.  
As recognized by some researchers such as Atkeson et al (2009), one extreme price time path 
would be hyperinflation.  Another more immediate, but less discussed extreme of price 
indeterminacy would be a liquidity trap where the central bank runs into a zero bound for the 
nominal interest rate and becomes impotent.  
 Economists have long debated the issue of whether an interest-setting rule can determine 
prices since Sargent and Wallace’s (1975) argument that doing so cannot determine prices.  
While many economists have argued that inflation targeting (IT) or price-level targeting (PLT) 
can determine prices when the central bank follows a Taylor-like monetary rule for setting the 
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interest rate, no literature has addressed whether nominal GDP targeting1 (NGT) determines 
prices.  Demonstrating that NGT does determine prices is the first task this paper accomplishes. 
 Even with regard to IT and PLT, the price determinacy issue is unresolved.  While many 
economists, such as Woodford (2003) and Clarida et al (1999), have previously argued that IT 
does determine the price level, most of that literature has made errors by applying a nonexplosive 
criterion without having any economic basis for doing so.  More recent literature recognizes 
these errors.  Cochrane (2010) notes that while transversality conditions can rule out real 
explosive behavior, nothing in economics can rule out nominal explosions.  Also, while many 
economists assumed that those using the nonexplosive criterion could justify it with 
transversality conditions, McCallum (2009, p. 1103) admits that there is no such transversality 
condition that justifies the use of the nonexplosive criterion in the case of fiat money.  Some 
economists have argued that in order for IT to determine price levels, we have to look for fiscal 
transversality conditions, but the economic profession has not endorsed the idea of using a 
government transversaility condition to justify the price determinacy of monetary policy. 
 Thus, even with IT and PLT, price determinacy has become an open question with some 
research saying that IT leads to price indeterminacy: See Cochrane (2010), Eagle (2007), and 
Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005). 
 The earlier literature on price determinacy used a nonexplosive criterion, which now 
McCallum recognizes is not justified by any transversality condition.  This leaves the state of the 
price determinacy literature in limbo.  While McCallum (2009) has tried to use learnability as a 
means to address price determinacy, Cochrane (2010) has argued against learnability as a 
sufficient way to address price determinacy. 
                                               
1
 Another term for nominal GDP targeting is nominal income targeting. 
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 Since the methodology used in the past for addressing price determinacy is now 
discredited, this paper takes a different approach to the issue of price determinacy.  The issue of 
price determinacy is hampered by the infinite time we use in our economic models.  If the time 
horizon was finite, we would just apply Bellman’s principle, work backwards in time with 
expectations, and there would be no question about whether monetary policy under a given 
monetary target would determine the price level.  However, to apply Bellman’s principle we 
need some future time to start our backwards expectations work.  When the economy lasts 
forever, then there is no future time to begin our backwards expectations calculations work. 
 The approach taken in this paper is to assume an arbitrarily large, but finite horizon in the 
economy, then apply Bellman’s principle to apply expectations backwards in time.  We add to 
this the issue of the public’s confidence concerning what the central bank will do in the last 
period of the economy.  To assess price determinacy, we propose two criteria.  The first criterion 
is that the price level should be determined in a finite economy under a particular monetary 
targeting rule.  The second criteria is that the public’s confidence in expected price levels should 
be maintained as the economic horizon increases to infinity.  The methodology proposed in this 
paper is that price determinacy should require both criteria to be met.  This sense of price 
determinacy carries important economic understanding, not just blindly applying rules that 
economists have invented (and that conflict with basic principles of calculus). 
 The next section sketches an economic model and quickly derives the Fisher Euler 
equation that is the basis in the price-determinacy literature for how expectations about future 
price levels is translated into the current price level.  Section III then discusses the price 
determinacy of NGT and introduces a feedback rule for the central bank to use to set the nominal 
interest rate as the central bank pursues its nominal GDP target.  This section also discusses the 
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issue of the public’s deteriorating confidence of what the central bank will do in the final period 
of the economy as that finite economic horizon increases.  This section then shows that that NGT 
does determine the price level as long as that feedback rule is sufficiently strong to compensate 
for public’s deteriorating confidence in the central bank’s final-period action as the time horizon 
increases. 
 Section IV discusses the price determinacy of PLT and finds that PLT does determine the 
price level as long as the central bank follows a sufficiently strong McCallum feedback rule.  
Section V discusses the price determinacy of IT and finds that IT does not determine the price 
level because even in a finite economy, there are fewer equations than unknowns.  Section VI 
discusses how IT may have appeared to work because the public confused IT with PLT; this 
section also discusses the base-drift difference between IT and PLT. 
Section VII discusses how the price determinacy of IT may have manifested itself in the 
liquidity traps or zero-bound nominal interest rates interfering with the ability of central banks to 
stimulate nominal spending in the economy.  Section VIII concludes and discusses how central 
banks could help avoid liquidity traps by following NGT rather than IT. 
 
II. The Fisher-Euler Equation: 
 Assume a representative consumer with an expected utility function of the form 
[ ]( )∑
=
T
t
t
t cUE
1
0 )(β  where β is the time discount factor and T is the arbitrarily large, but finite 
economic horizon.  When the consumer maximizes the utility function subject to typical budget 
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constraints involving money and nominal bonds, the previous literature2 has shown that these 
assumptions lead to following Euler equation: 



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t
tt
t
t
P
cU
ER
P
cU β  (1) 
where Rt is the gross nominal interest rate which equals one plus the regular nominal interest 
rate. Equation (2) states that marginal utility of consumption per “buck” today equals the gross 
nominal interest rate times the expected marginal utility of consumption per “buck” next year 
multiplied by the time discount factor.  Here “buck” refers to the particular monetary unit of the 
particular economic system we are looking at. 
 We also assume a pure exchange economy so that aggregate consumption equals 
aggregate output, tt Yc = .  Then this Euler equation becomes: 
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Equation (2) is often referred to as the Fisher-Euler equation because it relates the gross nominal 
interest rate to expected inflation and the determinants of the real interest rate.  
 Equation (2) is standard in the price determinacy literature except often that literature 
linearizes around a steady state.  In this paper, we will be able to speak more generally than a 
linearization around a steady state and therefore we will continue to work with equation (2).   
 For the model of this paper, assume a logarithmic utility function so tt YYU /1)(' = .  We 
assume this utility function for two reasons.  First, we can easy model NGT with this utility 
function without any further assumptions. Second, the logarithmic utility function has a constant 
relative risk coefficient, which if applied to diverse consumers with different borrowing and 
                                               
2
 See for example Woodford (2003) and Carlstrum and Fruest (2001). 
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lending needs would require perfectly successful NGT in order for borrowers and lenders to 
efficiently share real aggregate supply risks (See Eagle and Domian, 2005; Koenig, 2011; and 
Eagle and Christensen, 2012). 
 With the logarithmic utility function, (2) becomes 

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++ 11
11
tt
tt
tt YP
ER
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β  (3) 
By the equation of exchange, ttttt YPNVM == , (3) can be expressed as: 
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where Nt is the level of nominal GDP at time t. 
 
III. The Price Determinacy of Nominal GDP Targeting (NGT) 
 This section accomplishes two tasks.  First, it shows that NGT does determine the price 
level when the central bank follows a sufficiently strong feedback rule for setting the nominal 
interest rate.  Second, this section introduces this paper’s methodology for assessing price 
determinacy. 
 Assume the central bank targets NGDP where its NGDP target at time t is given by *tN .  
To do so, assume the central bank uses the following feedback rule for setting the nominal 
interest rate: 
τ
β 




=
+
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*
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t
t
t
t N
N
N
NR  (5) 
Substitute (5) for Rt in (4) to get: 
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which can be simplified to: 
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N
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N
N
 (6) 
 Remember we are now assuming an arbitrarily large, but finite horizon for the economy.  
We will apply Bellman’s principle and work backwards in time.  For time T, the Fisher-Euler 
equation (2) does not apply; at time T there will be no tomorrow; there will be no loans from 
time T to time T+1 and hence no interest rate at time T.  As a result, at time T the central bank 
will unable to peg the interest rate; hence, the central bank will have to set the money supply.  To 
model the economic response to the central bank setting the money supply in the last period of 
the economy, assume a link between money and the economy such as a cash-in-advance 
constraint.  That link between money and the economy may not be a perfect one, so the central 
bank may be unable to control NT perfectly by setting MT.  As a result, we will assume the central 
bank sets MT so that: 
*
11
TT
T NN
E =





 
which implies that: 
1
*
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
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


T
T
T N
NE  (7) 
 Apply Bellman’s principle, we move backwards in time to time t=T-1.  Taking the 
expectations of (7) based on the information set at time t=T-1, we get: 
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At time t=T-1, the Fisher-Euler equation (4) applies, and the central bank follows (5); therefore, 
(6) applies.  Applying (6) to time t=T-1 gives: 
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Substituting (8) into the above gives 11* 1 =−− TT NN .  Since we are assuming that the central bank 
is transparent in its nominal GDP target, the public’s expectation of the above at time t=T-2 is 
[ ] 11* 12 =−−− TTT NNE .  Substituting the above in (6) at time t=T-2 gives: 
τ+
−
−
−
−
−

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1
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As we work backwards through time applying Bellman’s principle, we find that, for any t in 
[0,T-1], 1
1
*
1
=





+
+
t
t
t N
NE .  Substituting this into (6) applied at time t gives 1
*
=
t
t
N
N
, which by 
backwards recursion shows that 1
*
=
t
t
N
N
 for t=0,1,…,T-1.  This also means that *tt NN =  for 
t=0,1,…,T-1.  In other words, Nt is determined for t=0,1,…,T-1 in this model.  Since Pt=Nt/Yt and 
Yt is exogenous, then Pt is determined for t=0,1,…,T-1.  In other words, the price level is 
determined under NGT in this model with a finite horizon. 
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 We should note that while it is exogenous, Yt can be stochastic so that Pt may be 
stochastic.  Nevertheless, Pt is still determined in the sense that given the exogenous Yt, Pt is 
determined. 
 This paper proposes the following methodology to assess the price determinacy of a 
monetary target/rule:  This methodology requires that two criteria be met in order for us to 
declare prices to be determined in the model.  The first criterion we call the “finite criterion,” 
which requires the price level be determined for a finite horizon.  The second criterion we call 
the “public’s confidence criterion,” which requires that the public’s confidence interval in the 
expected value determining the price level be finite as the economic horizon approaches infinity. 
 For NGT the preceding discussion shows that the first criterion is met.  To assess the 
second criterion, note that by backwards recursion, (6) and (8) imply that 
( )T
T
T
N
NE
N
N τ+














=
1
1
*
0
0
*
0
 (9) 
The above equation shows the expectations that determines the value of N0 and hence the value 
of P0=N0/Y0 where Y0 is exogenous.  Hence the issue about whether the public’s confidence in 
the expectations determining N0 and P0 is whether the public’s confidence in the right-hand side 
of (9) is maintained when T approaches infinity. 
 Let [ ]TT NN *,0 αΩ  be the public’s α% confidence interval at time 0 for TT NN *  given the 
public’s information set at time 0.  It may very well be the case that the [ ]TTT NN *,0lim αΩ∞→  is 
infinite, which means that the public’s confidence that central bank will be close to its NGDP 
target at time T will decrease (confidence interval increase), the further in the future is the last 
period. 
- 10 - 
 
 Let us first look at the case where τ = 0 in the central bank’s feedback rule (5) for setting 
the interest rate.  Then by (9), the public’s confidence in the expectations that determines 0*0 NN  
would be the same as [ ]TT NN *,0 αΩ .  Hence, if [ ] ∞=Ω
∞→
TTT
NN *
,0lim α , then the public’s 
confidence interval in the expectations determining 0
*
0 NN  would also be infinite meaning the 
public would have no confidence in 0
*
0 NN .  This in turn implies that the public would have no 
confidence in N0.  Since P0=N0/Y0, this would also imply that the public would have no 
confidence in P0.  It is in this sense that Sargent and Wallace (1975) argued that the price level 
would not be determined when the central bank pegged the interest rate rather than setting the 
money supply.  Hence, for τ = 0, a central bank following the feedback rule (5) while pursuing a 
NGDP target would not lead to price determinacy as defined by the methodology proposed in 
this paper.  While it would meet the first criterion of determining the price level in a finite 
economy, NGT with τ = 0 would not meet the second criterion; the public’s confidence in the 
expectations determining that price level would disappear as the economy’s horizon approaches 
infinity. 
 However, if τ is sufficiently positive, meaning a bigger central bank’s interest rate 
response when NGDP deviates from is targeted path, then the damping effect of τ in (9) may 
offset the increase in [ ]TT NN *,0 αΩ  as T approaches infinity.  For this sufficiently positive τ, if 
the public’s confidence in their expectations determining 0
*
0 NN  is maintained as T approaches 
infinity, the public confidence in N0 and P0 will be maintained as well. 
 Hence, it may be the case that for τ sufficiently positive; the public’s confidence in their 
expectations determining the expected value for 0
*
0 NN  as reflected in (9) will be maintained 
because the dampening effect of the positive τ offsets the decreasing public’s confidence is the 
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central bank’s action at time T as T increases to infinity.  In conclusion, a central bank following 
the monetary rule (5) for a sufficiently positive τ will meet both criteria for price determinacy.  
First, for a finite economy, NGT does determine prices, and second, for a sufficiently positive τ, 
the public’s confidence in their expectations of the determinant of the price level may be 
maintained. 
 Because we have not made specific assumptions about how the public’s confidence 
interval changes as T increases, we cannot say for sure that there exists a sufficiently positive 
value of τ.  However, if such a sufficiently positive τ does exist, then this explains how this 
strong reaction of the interest rate to deviations of NGDP from its target helps maintain the 
public’s confidence in the price level and in monetary policy.  This explanation is in sharp 
contrast to Cochrane (2010), where he argued that the use of the nonexplosive criterion as used 
in the previous price-determinacy literature was that the central bank was threatening the public 
with explosive monetary policy if the public’s expectations were not stable.  Cochrane’s view is 
one that looks forward in time rather than backwards in time.  Expectations works backwards in 
time.  When we realize that expectations works backwards in time, then we recognize that the 
positive τ has a dampening rather than explosive effect on expectations. 
 While this section discussed the methodology in terms of NGT, the previous literature 
has discussed usually PLT and IT.  How the second criterion is related to the previous literature 
is made clearer in the next sections that assess the price determinacy of PLT and IT. 
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IV. The Price Determinacy of Price-Level Targeting (PLT) 
 Let us now assume that instead of targeting NGDP, the central bank targets the price 
level, where its price level target at time t is given by *tP .  To try to meet this target, the central 
bank sets the interest rate according to the following feedback rule: 
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If substitute the right side of (10) for Rt in (3), we get:  
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which can be simplified to  
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 Let us first check whether the price level is determined for a finite horizon.  Again, at 
time T, the Fisher-Euler equation (2) does not apply, there is no interest rate that applies to a loan 
from time T to the nonexistent time T+1.  Hence, the central bank cannot peg the interest rate at 
time T.  Assume the central bank sets the money supply at time T so that [ ] *11 TTT PPE = , which 
implies that: 
1
*
=





T
T
T P
PE  (12) 
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 Applying Bellman’s principle, we move backwards in time to time t=T-1.  Taking 
expectations of (12) based on the information set at time T-1 gives [ ] 1*1 =− TTT PPE .  At time 
t=T-1, the Fisher-Euler equation (3) applies, and the central banks follows (10); therefore, (11) 
applies.  Substituting in [ ] 1*1 =− TTT PPE  gives: 
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Hence, * 11 −− = TT PP .  By backwards recursion, we conclude that *tt PP =  for t=0,1,…,T-1.  This 
then shows that PLT satisfies this paper’s first criterion of price determinacy: PLT does 
determine prices in a finite economy. 
 For the second criterion, we can solve (11) backwards to get: 
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Let [ ]TT PP /*,0 αΩ  be the public’s α% confidence interval at time 0 for TT PP /* .  Again, it may 
very well be the case that [ ]TTT PP /lim *,0 αΩ∞→  is infinite.  If the τ in the central bank’s feedback 
rule (10) is 0, then the public’s confidence in the expectations leading to P0 would disappear 
when T approaches infinity.  This is in essence the point Sargent and Wallace (1975) made 
where they in essence assumed the central bank targeted the price level.  They said that the 
current price level depended too much on what the central bank did in the far distant future. 
 However, for a sufficiently positive τ, the public’s confidence may be maintained even 
though [ ]TTT PP /lim *,0 αΩ∞→  is infinite.  This is the point of McCallum’s (1981) argument that a 
central bank could determine prices when setting the interest rate if the reaction of the central 
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bank to disparities of the price level from its target is strong enough.  When we look backwards 
in time, we find that positive τ decreases the degree to which current expectations depend on 
what the central bank will do in the far distant future.  Again, this interpretation differs from 
Cochrane (2010) where he argues that the central bank is threatening the public with explosive 
prices if the public does not constrain their expectations. 
 
V. The Price Indeterminacy of Inflation Targeting (IT) 
 In this section, we assume the central bank targets the inflation rate, where its inflation 
target at time t is given by *tpi  and we define 1−≡ ttt PPpi .  To try to meet this target, the central 
bank sets the nominal interest rate by following the following feedback rule: 
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Substituting the right side of (14) for Rt in (3) gives: 
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which simplifies to: 
τ
pi
pi
pi
pi +






=





+
+
1
1
1
*
1
*
t
t
t
t
t E  (15) 
 First, we need to investigate whether IT determines the price level when the economy has 
a finite horizon.  Applying Bellman’s principle, we start with time t=T.  At time the Fisher-Euler 
equation does not apply since there are no loans and hence no interest rate for time T to the 
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nonexistent time T+1.  Hence, the central bank must set the money supply at time T.  Assume the 
central bank targets the money supply so that [ ] */11 TTTE pipi = , which implies that 
1
*
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
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


T
T
TE pi
pi
 (16) 
 Continuing to apply Bellman’s principle, we move backwards in time to time t=T-1.  
Applying expectations based on the information set at time t=T-1 to both sides of (16), we get 
that [ ] 1*1 =− TTTE pipi .  The Fisher-Euler equation (3) does apply at time t=T-1 and the central 
bank follows the feedback rule (14) so that (15) applies.  Applying (15) at time t=T-1, we 
conclude that: 
τ
pi
pi
pi
pi +














=





−
−
−
1
1
*
1
1
*
1
T
T
T
T
T E =1 
Which implies that * 11 −− = TT pipi .  As we continue to move backwards in time, applying Bellman’s 
principle, we find that * 11 ++ = tt pipi , which also implies that [ ] 1/* 1 =+ tttE pipi .  When we substitute 
this result in (15), we then conclude that *tt pipi = .  Therefore, by backwards recursion, we 
conclude that *tt pipi =  for t=1,2,…,T-1. 
 In summary, by applying Bellman’s principle, we have concluded the following: 
*
tt pipi =  for t=1,2,…,T-1. 
[ ] 1*1 =− TTTE pipi  
This is a total of T equations.  By targeting inflation, which is the “speed” or derivative of the 
price level, the central bank will be unable to determine the price level in an economy with a 
finite horizon.  To see this, first note that there are only T equations above.  However, we need to 
determine either the actual price level or an expectation involving the price level for t=0,1,…,T; 
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which means there are T+1 unknowns.  Since there are more unknowns than equations, the price 
level is not determined. 
 To a mathematician, it should be of no surprise that the price level cannot be determined 
by targeting the derivative of the price level.  In calculus, it is well known that one cannot obtain 
the original function by merely integrating the original function; one needs an additional 
condition to do so.  In the case of inflation targeting, we do not have that additional condition. 
 Examples are the clearest proof that inflation targeting does not determine the price level.  
For this example, let us assume that a cash-in-advance constraint exists at time t=T so that 
TTT YPM = .  Assuming also that the central bank has perfect control over MT, then for a give YT, 
the central bank would be able to determine a value of PT to get *TT pipi = .  With this stronger 
assumption, we now have *tt pipi =  for t=1,2,…,T.  Let us also assume in this example that 
02.1* =tpi .  Then, we have 02.1
*
== tt pipi .  In other words, the inflation rate in our model is 
always 2%.  Any price path that meets the condition, tt PP )02.1(0= , will have this 2% inflation 
rate.  Clearly, P0 is not determined.  Again, this should be obvious from an understanding of 
calculus.  If P0 was 100 or 40 or 9878, as long as tt PP )02.1(0= , the inflation will be 2%. 
 We are talking about a flexible price model where P
-1 is given.  Some might wonder 
about the inflation rate at time 0, 100 / −= PPpi .  However, take the Fisher-Euler equation (3), 
multiply both sides by Pt and remember that 1/ −≡ ttt PPpi .  We get 






=
++ 11
11
tt
tt
t Y
ER
Y pi
β  
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The first period that this applies is t=0.  This means the first inflation rate that we get the 
inflation rate 1pi .  The Fisher-Euler equation does not apply to 0pi ; hence 0pi  is not determined in 
this model. 
 We could modify the model from a flexible price model to a model with price rigidities, 
and assume P0 is fixed.  However, by doing so, the Fisher-Euler equation must be changed to 
deal with these price rigidities.  Once we do that in a consistent fashion, we will have one less 
Fisher-Euler equation.  With one less equation and one less unknown, we still have price 
indeterminacy under IT. 
 
VI. Why IT Temporary May Have Determined the Price Level 
 Despite the theoretical argument that IT leads to price indeterminacy, some may wonder 
why IT worked, at least before the 2008 crisis.  My answer is that if the public was confused and 
thought the central bank was actually targeting the price level, then IT would have determined 
prices until the public learned differently. 
 The difference between IT and PLT is what Taylor (2006) calls “let bygones be bygones” 
and what McCallum (2011) calls “base drift.”  For example, assume the inflation target is 2% per 
annum.  Assume the current price is P0=100.  Then if the central bank were to forever meet its 
inflation target, then ttP )02.1(100=  for all future t.  Assume that the public is thinking the 
central bank is actually targeting the price level at ttP )02.1(100* = .  Since the public is more 
familiar with the term inflation than the price level, even if it were targeting the price level, the 
central bank would probably still communicate its intentions to the public in terms of the 
inflation rate.  As a result, it is very possible the public could be confused.  As long as the 
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inflation rate is as expected, then the project path for the price level would be the same for both 
IT and PLT: ttP )02.1(100= . 
 However, suppose at time t=1, the price level was 104 instead of 102, meaning that the 
central bank missed its target.  Under PLT, the central bank would try to get the price level back 
to its targeted path of ttP )02.1(100* = .  However, with IT the central bank would “let bygones be 
bygones” and merely try to get future inflation to equal its target.  Therefore, the central bank’s 
new intended price path would be 1)02.1(104 −= ttP , which is greater than its original intended 
price path of ttP )02.1(100= .  In essence, with IT the central bank “forgives” its past mistakes. 
 On the other hand if the price level was 101 instead of 102 at time t=1, again the central 
bank missed its target.  Under PLT, the central bank would try to increase the price level back to 
its targeted path of ttP )02.1(100* = .  However, with IT the central bank would “let bygones be 
bygones and merely try to get future inflation to meet its inflation target; the central bank would 
not try to make up for the lower inflation that occurred in period 1.  Under IT, the central banks 
new intended price path would be 1* )02.1(101 −= ttP , which is less than its original intended price 
path of ttP )02.1(100* = .  McCallum (2011) calls this “base drift” since if the price level strays 
from course, the central bank will allow this drift rather than steering the price level back to its 
original levels. 
 As Eagle (2012) shows, the price base drift inherent in IT will manifest itself in NGDP 
base drift.  For example, assume N0=1000 , if the long-run growth rate in the economy is 3% and 
the central bank wants a long-run inflation rate of 2%, then under NGDP targeting (NGT), the 
central bank would target the path of NGDP at ( )ttN )03.1)(02.1(1000* = .  Under IT, the initial 
intended path for NGDP would also be ( )ttN )03.1)(02.1(1000=  as long as real GDP (RGDP) 
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increased at its 3% long-run growth rate.  Thus, initially both NGT and IT have the same 
intended path for NGDP.  However, if N1 turns out being 1030 instead 1050 because 1pi  turned 
out being 0% instead of 2%, then under NGT, the central bank would try to return to its targeted 
NGDP path.  However, under IT, the central bank would “let bygones be bygones” and change 
its intended NGDP path to ( ) 1)03.1)(02.1(1030 −= ttN , which is less than its initial intend NGDP 
path.  We call this drift of NGDP “NGDP base drift.” 
 Eagle (2012) documents the statistical significant of NGDP base drift for the three U.S. 
recessions since 1990, which is within the time frame many economists have viewed the Federal 
Reserve as a “closet inflation targeter.” 
 
VII. How the Price Indeterminacy of IT can Manifest Itself in a Liquidity Trap 
 This section argues the price indeterminacy of IT can manifest itself in a liquidity trap or 
a zero-bound for the nominal interest rate that would cause the central bank to be impotent, 
which is a similar situation facing many central banks today.   My argument is in a much broader 
context than the simple flexible-price model for which I discussed the price determinacy of NT, 
PLT, and IT.  In particular, this section assumes the economy does have nominal rigidities 
especially with respect to wages.  As a result of these nominal rigidities, the immediate impact of 
a drop in NGDP is a drop in RGDP rather than in the price level. Because the price level in the 
short-run may be unresponsive to drops in NGDP, I talk about the NGDP base drift caused by IT 
rather than the price-level base drift. 
 After the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, NGDP dropped for most economies in the 
world.  These NGDP drops exerted downward pressure on prices and wages, but because of the 
nominal rigidities, these prices and wages did not immediately drop.  In fact, because of delayed 
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cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), many prices and wages continued to increase.  Since NGDP 
fell relative to its prerecession trend and prices and wages stagnated or increased, RGDP fell 
relative to its prerecession trend. If the central bank totally focused on prices, the central bank 
would not even notice that NGDP dropped.  However, in the last recession, all central banks 
were aware that NGDP was dropping below its prerecession trend.  Most of these central banks 
took action to try to boost nominal aggregate spending.  In particular, they lowered the nominal 
interest rates they set. 
 However, NGDP continued to fall.  If investors put their money into real capital, that 
capital likely would have a negative return in the economy since the demand for the products 
produced by that real capital had decreased because of the drop in NGDP.  Even if the investor 
could find some non-capital assets that experienced little or no depreciation, one possible future 
outcome would be that those assets would depreciate in nominal terms in the future.  If investors 
expect that nominal depreciation, then these investors would be better off holding cash rather 
than the asset.  This is especially true since we know that the drop in NGDP will be putting 
downward pressure on all prices.  Even if those prices are slow to adjust, if the investor realizes 
than that downward pressure exists, then the investor should recognize that this is not the time to 
buy those assets. 
 Another possibility is that NGDP will rebound.  However, given the experience in the 
U.S. since 1990 as documented by Eagle (2012), that rebound in NGDP is very unlikely.  That 
empirical evidence gives investors knowledge about how the central bank will react when the 
central bank is targeting inflation.  They know that the central bank will “let bygones be 
bygones” and let NGDP remain at its lower level.  So the investors do not invest in real capital or 
other assets.  Instead, they hold cash, which is Keynes’ liquidity trap.  Since they do not invest in 
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real capital or other assets, NGDP falls.  The holding of cash by these investors rather than 
spending this cash contributes to keeping NGDP from increasing in the future.  The investors 
holding this cash rather than spending the cash becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy – NGDP does 
not increase and the central banks “let bygones be bygones” deciding to let the NGDP base drift 
downward and just try to get NGDP to increase in the future in a manner consistent with their 
inflation target.   By focusing on inflation, not nominal aggregate spending, the central banks 
does not try to return NGDP to its prerecession trend. 
 Instead of targeting inflation, suppose a central bank targets NGDP.  Assume that this 
central bank is both transparent and credible in its pursuit of the NGDP target.  When NGDP 
falls, investors know that sooner or later the central bank will reverse the drop of NGDP back to 
its prerecession trend, which we assume is also the targeted level of NGDP.  Also, recognize that 
since NGDP fell, prices and wages did not increase as much as the inflation targeted by the 
central bank.  The central bank’s intended increase of NGDP back to its prerecession 
trend/targeted path will therefore mean inflation will at some point have to be higher than the 
long-run inflation rate desired by the central bank.  If investors believe the central bank will 
pursue this NGDP target and will not “let bygones be bygones,” then the investors should know 
that the question is not if the higher inflation will occur but when will it occur.  They also will 
recognize that the more NGDP falls below its target, the higher inflation will have to be as a 
result of the return of NGDP to its target; investors know that sometime in the future if they hold 
cash instead of investing that money in assets, they will lose value because of the inflation.  This 
will discourage investors from holding cash and encourage them to spend their cash on real 
capital or other assets. 
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 In summary, if the central bank targets NGDP rather than allowing permanent NGDP 
base drift, the expectation of the higher inflation will discourage investors leaving their money in 
cash and will reduce the likelihood of a liquidity trap. 
 
VIII. Conclusions and a Caveat 
 This paper proposes a new methodology for assessing price determinacy of monetary 
targeting regimes when the central bank pegs the interest rate instead of setting the money 
supply.  This methodology involved two criteria.  The first criterion is whether the price level is 
determined in an economy with a finite horizon.  The second criterion concerned whether the 
public’s confidence in monetary policy is maintained as the finite horizon increases to infinity.  
Using that methodology, we find that NGDP targeting (NGT) and price-level targeting (PLT) do 
lead to price determinacy when the central bank follows a sufficiently strong feedback rule for 
setting the interest rate.  On the other hand, we find that inflation targeting (IT) does not 
determine prices even when following a Taylor-like rule; IT fails the first criterion; IT cannot 
determine prices in an economy with a finite horizon.  The conclusion that IT does not lead to 
price determinacy is consistent with the principle from calculus which states that one cannot 
recover the original function by merely integrating the derivative. 
 We also argue that the price indeterminacy of inflation targeting can manifest itself into a 
liquidity trap or zero bound for nominal interest rates as currently being experienced in many 
economies of the world. 
 In our investigation of price determinacy, we were able to discuss global price 
determinacy rather than just local determinacy because we did not linearize the model around a 
steady state.  Also, we used central-bank feedback rules to result in difference equations 
- 23 - 
 
involving deviations from the targets that were the same as appeared in most of the price 
determinacy literature. 
 However, at this point we add a caveat.  We have found an inconsistency concerning 
“current IT,” “current PLT,” and “current NGT.”  The reason is because the previous literature 
on “current IT” and “current PLT” have not used consistent and rigorous central bank feedback 
rules.  For the final contribution of this paper, we now discuss the logical inconsistency of these 
central bank feedback rules. 
 Our formulation of the feedback rules is similar to those by Carlstrum and Fruest (2001), 
but which is in essence consistent with other researchers as well.  For PLT, our feedback rule 
was equation (10), where the central bank looked at how the current price level differed from the 
targeted price level when it pegged the nominal interest rate.  However, in a flexible price model, 
the current price level is not yet determined.  Thus, the logic of the central bank observing the 
current price level, then setting the interest rate, which then determines the current price level is 
really circular logic. 
 Similarly for IT, the feedback rule (14) had the central bank observing how the current 
inflation rate compared to the targeted inflation rate as the central bank pegged the interest rate, 
which then (according to previous literature) would determine the current price level. 
 Also for NGT, the feedback rule (5) had the central bank observing the current level of 
NGDP to peg the interest rate, but that current level of NGDP was being determined by the 
Fisher-Euler equation and the central bank’s pegging of that interest rate.  A more logically 
consistent approach would be to look at past prices, inflation, or NGDP instead of current prices, 
inflation, or NGDP.  For PLT and IT, Eagle(2007) does use such feedback rules; while the 
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resulting formulas are more complex, Eagle still reaches the conclusions that PLT leads to price 
determinacy but IT does not. 
 Hence, we can look at our basing these feedback rules on current prices, inflation, and 
NGDP as something that simplifies our results without having an impact on our basic 
conclusions. 
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